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Choisir de choisir 
— croire en ce monde
Ronald Bogue
RÉSUMÉ
Dans la philosophie de Pascal et Kierkegaard aussi bien que dans le
cinéma de Bresson et Dreyer, Deleuze décèle une «pensée étrange»,
un «moralisme extrême qui s’oppose à la morale» et une « foi qui
s’oppose à la religion». Cette pensée peut être décrite comme une
éthique immanente exigeant que l’on « choisisse de choisir » et
permettant à celui qui l’adopte de «croire en ce monde». Le pari de
Pascal et l’acte de foi de Kierkegaard sont habituellement traités
comme des concepts exclusivement théologiques, mais Deleuze 
— en adoptant une perspective nietzschéenne — voit ces concepts
comme des moyens permettant de mieux connaître un mode
particulier d’existence, où l’individu «choisit de choisir » et, dès lors,
endosse la responsabilité perpétuelle de ses choix. Dans les œuvres
de Dreyer et Bresson, Deleuze découvre une contrepartie ciné -
matographique à cette philosophie du « choisir de choisir », un
cinéma dans lequel les préoccupations apparemment religieuses
témoignent en fait d’une éthique immanente des modes d’existence.
Ce cinéma met en lumière la vocation fondamentale du cinéma
moderne : rendre possible une « croyance en ce monde». Le pro -
blème auquel doivent faire face les réalisateurs modernes est que le
monde ne semble être rien d’autre qu’un mauvais film, une
collection de clichés prévisibles et vides excluant toute possibilité de
véritable créativité. La réponse du cinéma moderne à ce défi consiste
à remettre en question les façons de voir traditionnelles et à proposer
des solutions de rechange aux conventions, afin que de nouvelles
possibilités d’existence soient proposées. En ce sens, le cinéma
moderne permet de faire renaître une « croyance en ce monde».
N’étant désormais plus un monde de clichés, le monde tel que le
transforme le cinéma moderne en est un dans lequel de nouveaux
modes d’existence sont envisagés, des modes d’existence qui
reposent sur une éthique exigeant que, perpétuellement, l’on
«choisisse de choisir ». Cette éthique cinématographique offre en fin
de compte un moyen de comprendre la véritable relation unissant le
cinéma et la philosophie, qui partagent un même objectif bien que
leurs sphères d’activité soient distinctes.
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To Choose to Choose—
To Believe in this World
Ronald Bogue
ABSTRACT
In the philosophy of Pascal and Kierkegaard and the cinema of
Bresson and Dreyer, Deleuze finds “a strange thought,” an
“extreme moralism that opposes the moral,” and a “faith that
opposes religion.” This thought may be described as an
immanent ethics of “choosing to choose,” such that one may
thereby “believe in this world.” Pascal’s wager and Kierkegaard’s
leap of faith are usually treated as exclusively theological
concepts, but Deleuze—by way of a Nietzschean adaptation of
Pascal and Kierkegaard—sees these concepts as a means of
understanding a specific mode of existence, in which one
“chooses to choose,” and thereby commits oneself to the
perpetual responsibility of choosing. In the work of Dreyer and
Bresson, Deleuze discovers a cinematic counterpart of this
philosophy of “choosing to choose,” a cinema in which
apparently religious concerns actually manifest an immanent
ethics of modes of existence. This cinema highlights the
fundamental vocation of modern cinema, which is to make
possible a “belief in this world.” The problem facing modern
directors is that the world seems nothing but a bad film, a
collection of predictable and empty clichés devoid of any
possibility of genuine creativity. Modern cinema’s answer to this
challenge is to disrupt conventional ways of seeing and disclose
already present alternatives to those conventions, such that new
possibilities of existence are suggested. In this way, modern
cinema allows a revived “belief in this world.” No longer a world
of clichés, the world as transformed through modern cinema is
one in which new modes of existence are envisioned, modes
based on an ethics of perpetually “choosing to choose.” This
cinematic ethics finally provides a means of understanding the
proper relationship between cinema and philosophy, both of
which have a common purpose, even if they have separate
spheres of activity.
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Though one might argue that all of Deleuze’s work deals with
ethics, the topic itself does not arise frequently in his writings. In
Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, however, ethics is addressed directly
when Deleuze says that “we need an ethic or a faith, which
makes idiots laugh” (1985/1989, p. 225/173),1 an ethic of choos-
ing to choose and a faith that allows belief in this world. In the
philosophy of Pascal and Kierkegaard and in the cinema of
Bresson and Dreyer, Deleuze finds “a strange thought,” an
“extreme moralism that opposes the moral,” a “faith that opposes
religion” (1983/1986, p. 163/116). This conjunction of Pascal,
Kierke gaard, Bresson and Dreyer, says Deleuze, “weaves a set
of invaluable relations between philosophy and cinema”
(1983/1986, p. 163/116). Striking is the fact that this “strange
thought” is usually articulated in terms of the transcendent—
specifically, the transcendent terms of Catholicism in the case of
Pascal and Bresson, and those of Protestantism in Kierkegaard
and Dreyer—whereas Deleuze consistently maintains that his
thought is above all a philosophy of immanence. One might ask,
then, by what means and for what purposes Deleuze appropri-
ates this transcendent thought for an immanent ethics, and in
what ways he delineates a specifically cinematic dimension of
that ethics. And beyond these issues, one might ask of this meet-
ing of philosophy and cinema the larger question of Deleuze’s
conception of the basic relationship between these two enterpris-
es. In What Is Philoso phy? Deleuze insists on the separate voca-
tions of philosophy and the arts, but in Cinema 2 he suggests a
more intimate relationship between philosophy and cinema, and
perhaps it is in the domain of this immanent ethics that cinema
serves a privileged function for philosophical thought.
The first task in exploring this “strange” philosophical-cine-
matic thought is to determine the manner in which Deleuze
reads the philosophers Pascal and Kierkegaard. Deleuze’s earliest
engagement with Pascal and Kierkegaard comes in Nietzsche
and Philosophy, during his analysis of Nietzsche’s sense of the
tragic and its relationship to chance. Deleuze notes that Pascal
and Kierkegaard are often labeled “tragic philosophers” and that
both formulate an ethics of risk and the aleatory, Pascal with his
wager of God’s existence, Kierkegaard with his leap of faith.
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Pascal’s wager and Kierkegaard’s leap of faith prefigure
Nietzsche’s cosmic throw of the dice, but in Deleuze’s view
Nietzsche’s Christian antecedents remain trapped in a tragedy of
guilt and dread, whereas Nietzsche embraces a tragedy of joyous
affirmation. Pascal and Kierkegaard are poets of “the ascetic
ideal” (Deleuze 1962/1983, p. 42/36), who oppose convention-
al morality and reason, but only via “interiority, anguish, groan-
ing, culpability, all the forms of discontent” (Deleuze
1962/1983, p. 42/36). What they lack is Nietzsche’s “sense of
affirmation, the sense of exteriority, innocence and play”
(Deleuze 1962/1983, p. 42/36). The Pascalian wager especially
reveals a mentality of ressentiment, in that Pascal’s gambler tries
to overcome chance and hedge all bets, to transcend the insecu-
rity of the aleatory and escape to a providential beyond. The
Nietzschean throw of the dice, by contrast, is an affirmation of
each aleatory cast, whatever its specific outcome.
In subsequent references to Pascal, Deleuze for the most part
simply reiterates his assessment of the Pascalian wager, but his
engagement with Kierkegaard is somewhat more detailed in
later works. His most extended treatment of Kierkegaard is in
Difference and Repetition, where he parallels the concepts of rep-
etition developed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The two
Kierkegaardian texts on which Deleuze concentrates are
Repetition and Fear and Trembling, published the same day in
1843. Kierkegaard’s chief aim in these works is to challenge the
reigning Hegelianism of his day and assert the primacy of reli-
gion and the personal over philosophy and the collective.2 In
Hegel’s terms, Kierkegaard’s position might be characterized as
that of the “Unhappy Consciousness,” that phase of the dialec-
tic traced in the Phenomenology of Mind in which consciousness
recognizes itself as at once finite and infinite (or delimited and
undelimited), yet without any means of overcoming this funda-
mental contradiction. In this basically religious consciousness,
spirit (or mind) is aware of itself as a finite entity, yet also as a
faculty capable of determining all natures through thought, and
hence capable of comprehending the infinite. But the unhappy
consciousness cannot grasp itself as being both a limited entity
and an unlimited capacity of mind, and as a result it attributes
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that unlimited capacity to an eternal and infinite God, from
which consciousness is separated, despite its sensed affinities
with that God. To overcome this division, says Hegel, con-
sciousness must make a “movement” (bewegung) of thought,
whereby spirit understands itself as the medium of the infinite
coming to awareness of itself in time. In this higher form of
consciousness, or absolute mind, the finite spirit recognizes itself
as the necessary manifestation of the infinite. A religious unhap-
py consciousness thus gives way to a superior philosophical
absolute mind; the individual spirit transcends its finitude and
discovers itself as one with the infinite and undelimited. The
ethical and political consequences of this movement beyond
unhappy consciousness are that the individual comes to com-
prehend itself in its universal humanness, to recognize its own
goals and purposes in the communal purposes of all humanity,
and to find freedom and ultimate fulfillment through the ratio-
nal coordination of action within social institutions.
Kierkegaard rejects the Hegelian elevation of philosophy over
religion and its valorization of the collective over the individual,
arguing instead that the religious and the individual (in a certain
guise) represent the highest form of experience and thought.
The movement of thought that Kierkegaard traces is not one
from Unhappy Consciousness to Absolute Mind, but a three-
stage movement from what Kierkegaard labels the “aesthetic,”
through the “ethical” to the “religious.” The “aesthetic,” by
which Kierkegaard means the consciousness inherent in imme-
diate sensual experience, is a form of consciousness that is sur-
passed by the “ethical,” another word for Hegelian universal
philosophical reason, but what Kierkegaard (1983, p. 62) calls
the “religious” is a mode of being beyond reason, ethics and the
universal, in which the ethical may be suspended and the indi-
vidual enters into “an absolute relation to the absolute.”
In Repetition, Kierkegaard initially frames the difference
between the ethical and the religious in terms of contrasting
conceptions of time, the one manifesting a temporality of recol-
lection, the other a temporality of repetition. “Repetition and
recollection,” he says, “are the same movement, except in oppo-
site directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated back-
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ward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward”
(Kierkegaard 1983, p. 131). Obviously, with the term “recollec-
tion” Kierkegaard is invoking Platonic anamnesis, that re-memo-
ration whereby the mind recalls those universal, eternal truths
that it once knew but has since forgotten. But Kierkegaard
insists as well that the Hegelian movement of thought is no
alternative to Platonic anamnesis. Rather, it is simply another
version of recollection, despite its terminology of “movement”
and “mediation.” In Platonic anamnesis, the true, the eternal,
the non-finite, the Whole, has always been, and thought is
merely a present recalling of that totality. In the Hegelian move-
ment of mediation, the true, eternal, non-finite Whole becomes
manifest through history, but once revealed, it remains the same
unchanged Whole as in Plato, and the process of its temporal
revelation ultimately affects that Whole in no meaningful way.
For Kierkegaard, by contrast, the infinite is beyond full compre-
hension and containment, a Whole that is genuinely open to
change in the future, and hence an unbounded Whole.
Kierkegaard’s point is roughly the same as that made later by
Bergson: in Plato and Hegel the Whole is given, that is, the
Whole is presupposed as a closed, complete and knowable enti-
ty, whereas for Kierkegaard and Bergson the Whole is open, a
genuinely becoming Whole that is constitutively unknowable in
any permanent sense. To engage such an open Whole, thought
must abandon the backward movement of recollection and
embrace the forward movement of repetition. Kierkegaard’s
(1983, p. 149) concise though somewhat cryptic formulation of
the recollection-repetition opposition is that “When the Greeks
said that all knowing is recollecting, they said that all existence,
which is, has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one
says: actuality, which has been, now comes into existence.”
What repeats in repetition is life (not knowing, as in recollec-
tion), and that vital repetition consists of a manifestation of an
open, ungraspable Whole in a concrete instant (an “actual ity”)
that is followed by a subsequent instant in which the open,
ungraspable Whole yet again “now comes into existence.” 
What is at stake in Kierkegaard’s reflection on time is the sta-
tus of the future in recollection and in repetition. In recollec-
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tion, the Whole is closed and knowable. Whether it is suddenly
recollected in Platonic anamnesis, or slowly revealed through the
Hegelian movement of mediation, once that Whole is fully
comprehended the future is empty. At that point, the Whole, as
completed entity, has exhausted its possibilities, and the future
can be only a reiteration of that selfsame set of possibilities. In
repetition, by contrast, the Whole is open and ungraspable, as
yet undetermined and undeterminable. The instant in which
this open Whole comes into existence is always full of unknow-
able possibilities. The future is a genuine future, in which time
matters, that is, in which the forward surge of time makes a dif-
ference. To engage the time of repetition, one must go beyond
the domain of the “ethical,” which belongs to a time of recollec-
tion, and enter the domain of the “religious.”
In Repetition, Kierkegaard’s chief exemplar of the movement
beyond the ethical to the religious is Job, but perhaps his most
illuminating example of the religious consciousness is Abraham,
the central figure in Fear and Trembling. Abraham is called to
commit an incomprehensible act, one that by the standards of
universal morality must be condemned as murder. He has vari-
ous rational means of avoiding the dilemma of his situation, but
he declines them all. He makes a leap of faith, moving beyond
the human community into an immediate and personal rela-
tionship with God. As he prepares to sacrifice Isaac, there seems
no possible outcome other than Isaac’s death, but Abraham
trusts, despite all reason, that his son will be fully restored to
him in this life. For God, all things are possible, which means
that for Abraham, the future is genuinely open. Unlike the trag-
ic hero, who subordinates one ethical norm to another (such as
Agamemnon, who subordinates his duty as a father to his duty
as a king in sacrificing his daughter), Abraham enters a domain
in which the ethical is suspended altogether. He goes beyond
universal humanity to become a specific individual in an
absolute relationship with the absolute. He is what Kierkegaard
(1983, p. 39) calls a “Knight of Faith,” and his leap beyond
rational comprehension and ethical norms brings him into a
cheerful enjoyment of this world. “He finds pleasure in every-
thing, takes part in everything,” and seems no different from the
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average well-fed Burgher. But for him, all has been transformed,
since the world now is replete with possibility.
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze identifies four elements
common to Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of repeti-
tion. First, both “make of repetition itself something new”
(Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 13/6), in that both regard repetition as
the reiteration of unpredictable possibility, a repeated coming
into being of an open Whole in Kierkegaard, a repeated cosmic
throw of the dice in Nietzsche. Second, both “oppose repetition
to the laws of Nature” (Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 13/6), in that they
reject the deterministic, mechanistic model of a nature regulated
by linear causality and hence subject to total predictability (at
least in theory). Third, they “oppose repetition to moral law”
(Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 14/6), Kierkegaard by positing an ulti-
mate suspension of the ethical, Nietzsche by advocating a
thought beyond good and evil. Finally, both “oppose repetition
not only to the generalities of habit, but also to the particularities
of memory” (Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 15/7), that is, both reject a
thought that looks backward via memory (be it Platonic anamne-
sis, Hegelian mediation, or a Humean association of ideas
through habit) and embrace a thought that forgets what it thinks
it knows and thereby becomes an active power capable of engag-
ing an emergent future.
Deleuze does not minimize the differences between
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and he makes it clear that his own
concept of repetition is much closer to that of Nietzsche than
that of Kierkegaard. Indeed, if we now consider the question of
how Deleuze appropriates Kierkegaard’s transcendent thought
of the leap of faith for his own philosophy of immanence, we
might say that it is primarily by reading Kierkegaard through
Nietzsche. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the transcendent is part of
his rejection of Hegel’s ontology of immanent absolute spirit
coming to consciousness of itself through time. The domain of
the religious emerges as a transcendent disruption of the conti-
nuities, regularities and inevitabilities of communal ethics
and universal reason. The religious enters existence in “the
moment,” a transcendent rupture in historical time, and it
defies rational comprehension as well as assimilation within
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human morality. What Nietzsche’s concept of repetition allows
Deleuze to do is to make Kierkegaard’s transcendent force of
disruption a part of a new, non-Hegelian ontology of difference.
One might say, with a great deal of caution, that what was God
in Kierkegaard becomes, through Nietzsche, difference in
Deleuze. Put another way, the Kierkegaardian religious force
that disrupts the Hegelian cosmos of immanent absolute spirit
becomes the operative force immanent within a cosmos of self-
differentiating difference.
A key element of Deleuze’s ontology of difference is
Nietzsche’s concept of the Eternal Return, which Deleuze pre-
sents as a perpetually repeated cosmic throw of the dice. In
Deleuze’s ontology, however, this repetition is not purely chaot-
ic. Rather, the series of dice throws is like a Markov chain, a for-
mal model in which a discrete set of possibilities produces a sec-
ond set of possibilities, which in turn produces a third, each set
in the chain of events being affected and partially determined by
the preceding set, yet with each set’s potential for subsequent
differentiation always being multiple and undeterminable.3 The
relationship between events is at once contingent and necessary,
unpredictable yet non-arbitrary. Each set, in its multiple possi-
bilities, exceeds any identity. It is a difference in itself, unfolding
into further states of self-differing difference. The cosmos, as
repeated dice throw, then, may be seen as an open Whole of
interconnected Markov chains, each a contingent and necessary
sequence of throws of the dice, any given result of a throw hav-
ing immanent within it the potential for multiple outcomes in
the next throw.
In Difference and Repetition , Deleuze distinguishes
Kierkegaard’s repetition from Nietzsche’s by saying that
Kierkegaard leaps whereas Nietzsche dances (1968/1994,
p. 19/10), by which he means that Kierkegaard’s leap is a one-
time cosmic wager, whereas Nietzsche’s dance is a perpetually
repeated series of dice throws. But what is essential to the two
thinkers, says Deleuze, is that they produce movement within
thought, in the sense both of going beyond the false movement
of Hegelian mediation, and of inventing new means of philo-
sophical expression. Rather than represent concepts, they “dra-
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matize Ideas” (Deleuze 1968/1994, p. 18/10). They create a
theatre within philosophy, each complete with its “heroes of
repetition: Job-Abraham, Dionysus-Zarathustra” (Deleuze
1968/1994, p. 13/5), a theatre that exceeds representation
through “vibrations, rotations, turnings, gravitations, dances or
leaps that directly touch the mind” (Deleuze 1968/1994,
p. 16/8).
“I pay attention only to the movements,” says Kierkegaard
(1983, p. 38), and in Difference and Repetition Deleuze identi-
fies that principle as the source of Kierkegaard’s theatre of repe-
tition. But when Deleuze comments on this “marvelous motto”
in his analysis of movement in A Thousand Plateaus, he says
that Kierkegaard “is acting astonishingly like a precursor of the
cinema” (1980/1987, p. 344/281). It comes as no surprise,
then, that Kierkegaard appears in both Cinema 1 and Cinema
2. In each volume, Kierkegaard is invoked as a guide toward an
ethics of “choosing to choose” and a faith that induces “belief
in this world.” What Deleuze finds interesting in Pascal, but
especially in Kierkegaard, is that a genuine choice “does not
bear on the terms one might choose, but on the modes of exis-
tence of the one who chooses” (1983/1986, p. 160/114). One
mode of life, for example, is that of the ideologue, or the true
believer, for whom the answers are already given and there is
nothing to choose. Another is that of the indifferent or the
uncertain, those who lack the capacity to choose or who never
know enough to be able to choose. A third is that of the fatal-
ists and devotees of evil, those who make a single choice that
commits them to an inevitable and unavoidable sequence of
actions that afford no further choice. And finally, there is the
mode of existence of those who choose to choose, those who
affirm a life of continuous choosing. The choice in this last
mode of existence, in short, “has no other object than itself: I
choose to choose, and by that means I exclude every choice
made according to the mode of having no choice” (Deleuze
1983/1986, p. 161/114).
Those who choose to choose affirm the possible. Like
Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith, they leap beyond rational and
ethical certainties into an open Whole, their leap being an act of
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trust in possibilities beyond their present comprehension.
Choosing to choose is crucial for Deleuze because contemporary
men and women have lost faith with this world, that is, they no
longer believe in the possibility of anything new. The world is a
bad movie, an endless series of banalities and clichés, platitudes
and vacuous opinions. But this does not mean simply that the
world is insipid and boring; it can also be an insidious and coer-
cive film. Deleuze says that for modern directors the world as
bad film constitutes “the intolerable,” but in his study of
Foucault he also treats all of Foucault’s work as a response to
“the intolerable.”4 In Discipline and Punish, for example, the
present prison system is the intolerable. As Foucault shows,
within the first forty years of its existence, the prison’s draw-
backs and failures are evident, and within those forty years one
hears the same calls for reform and recommendations for more
prisons, better prisons, stricter prisons, etc. that one hears today.
The penal system is a bad movie, an endless recycling of prac-
tices and discourses that seem unavoidable, inescapable, devoid
of real alternatives, emptied of all genuine possibility.
The only viable response to the intolerable is to think differ-
ently, to disconnect the world’s networks of certainties and
pieties and formulate new problems that engender as yet
unmapped relations and connections. For modern film direc-
tors, thinking differently, at its most fundamental level, is a mat-
ter of disconnecting and reconnecting images. The world as bad
movie consists of myriad chains of association, which in strictly
visual terms may be conceived of as images linked to other
images to form natural, predictable, redundant sequences. The
first task of thinking differently in images is to “disenchain” the
chains, to dissolve the links of habitual association that tie
images to one another (such links are embedded in the com-
monsense spatiotemporal regularities of the sensori-motor
schema). The second task is to take a given image and “choose
another image that will induce an interstice between the two”
(Deleuze 1985/1989, p. 234/179). Such a choice will be contin-
gent but not arbitrary, the choice of image being the result of a
search for productive juxtapositions, such that the sequence of
images becomes a self-differentiating series, but one in which
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the gaps between images retain their primacy. Each gap in such
a series, then, is the site of a choice, a throw of the dice, a leap,
an experimentation in a zone of possibilities. The gap itself is off
the map of the known world; it is a pure Outside uncharted by
external spatial or internal psychological coordinates. The series
of images formed by such choices “re-enchains” the images, but
such that they form Markov chains, contingent but necessary
iterations of possibilities differentiating themselves into further
possibilities. In this regard, the choice of images is an ontologi-
cal choice, the process of choosing constituting a mode of exis-
tence that is inseparable from the becoming of the cosmos as an
open Whole of self-differentiating differences.
In Cinema 2, Deleuze discusses the Pascalian and
Kierkegaardian theme of choosing to choose through the films of
Rohmer, Dreyer, and Bresson, the choice of directors obviously
being guided in part by their frequent treatment as filmmakers
concerned with religious themes. Certainly in the work of
Bresson, if we limit our attention to that director, the religious
dimension is incontestable. Besides dealing with explicitly reli-
gious subjects (Le journal d’un curé de campagne, Le procès de
Jeanne d’Arc), Bresson constructs what might be considered para-
bles of grace, the grace that like the wind blows where it will in
Un condamné à mort s’est échappé, or the grace that miraculously
brings Michel to Jeanne at the end of Pickpocket. Au hasard,
Balthazar and Le procès may be regarded as studies of sainthood,
Mouchette and Une femme douce as films about suffering and the
problematic redemption of suicide, Le diable, probablement and
L’argent as Jansenist essays in the bleakness of a world deprived of
saving grace. Yet if religious concerns are patent in Bresson’s
films, they are handled in a way that allows non-religious inter-
pretations as well. If the influence of a transcendent deity or a
providential grace may be regarded as shaping events in his films,
it is always by invisible means. No numinous clouds, transverse
shafts of light, or surging strains of angelic choirs signal the pres-
ence of the divine. Rather, the workings of grace shape a consis-
tently sober, often grim and insistently material world whose
atmosphere, especially in the black-and-white films of the 1950s
and 1960s, has some affinities with that of Italian Neo-realism.
To Choose to Choose—To Believe in this World 43
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:11  Page 43
Bresson’s ascetic reduction of compositional elements, his focus
on isolated objects, his separation of elements from their usual
contexts (especially hands, feet and torsos), his spare use of cam-
era movement and contrasting angles, all suggest a de-realizing
formalism consistent with a certain monastic sensibility, but the
same techniques may be seen as means of enhancing the intensi-
ty of sensual experience and focusing the viewer’s attention on
the life of the lived body. The result is that Bresson’s cinema has
lent itself to multiple, contradictory interpretations, especially as
regards the status of the transcendent in his work. Paul Schrader
(1972, pp. 59-108), for example, considers Bresson to be the
quintessential practitioner of the transcendental style in film,
whereas Jonathan Rosenbaum (1998, p. 21) counters that
Bresson is the ultimate materialist. Those who stress the formalist
aspects of Bresson’s films do so often to emphasize the invisible
presence of the transcendent, whereas those who focus on the
centrality of sensation and the inseparable conjunction of per-
ception and emotion in his films tend to call attention to the
insistent corporeality of any reputedly immaterial forces. Hence,
Keith Reader (2000, p. 49) can say of Un condamné that it is a
“spiritual realist” film, open at once to a transcendental and a
non-transcendental interpretation, and Amedée Ayfre (1969,
p. 21) can say of the transcendental in Bresson that “we are deal-
ing with immanent transcendence, or even, one might say, with
radical invisibility,” in that “the invisible world remains invisible,
or rather appears only as invisible.” Clearly, if Deleuze must read
Kierkegaard through Nietzsche to transform a philosophy of
transcendence into a thought of immanence, no such interpre-
tive labour is required with Bresson, since the transformation of
transcendence into immanence may be regarded as having
already taken place in his films.
Deleuze touches on the element of choice in the narratives of
Bresson’s films, and he alludes to Bresson’s persistent dramatiza-
tion of the theme of grace or chance, but Deleuze’s interest in
Bresson is largely formal rather than diegetic or thematic.
Deleuze stresses the principle of “fragmentation” in Bresson’s
practice, especially as it is brought to bear in the construction of
an espace quelconque. In the famous Gare de Lyon sequence of
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Pickpocket, for example, the conventional spatio-temporal con-
nections between elements are broken and the space is frag-
mented into components capable of being reconnected in
diverse ways. “It is a perfectly singular space,” says Deleuze,
“which has simply lost its homogeneity. . . . It is a space of
 virtual connection, grasped as a pure place of the possible”
(Deleuze 1983/1986, p. 155/109). Deleuze also cites Bresson as
one of the great innovators in the handling of sound. Bresson
treats the sonic and the visual as separate strata, thereby intro-
ducing a gap between sight and sound that complements the
gap between images that structures the visual. Bresson
(1975/1997, p. 62/62) says that he seeks in his films a “sort of
relay” between sight and sound, and Deleuze says that a “com-
ing-and-going” between the visual and the sonic “defines the
modern cinema” (1985/1989, p. 322/247).
In his Cinema 2 discussion of choosing to choose, however,
Deleuze concentrates on a third aspect of Bresson’s cinema: that
of Bresson’s selection, training and manipulation of actors, or as
Bresson prefers to call them, “models.” Bresson (1975/1997,
p. 29/32) observes that “nine-tenths of our movements obey
habit and automatism. It is anti-nature to subordinate them to
the will and to thought.” Traditionally trained actors are inca-
pable of performances informed by such natural automatism, so
he works largely with non-professionals. He forces his “models”
to rehearse repeatedly until their gestures and words become
automatic, and he demands that his models eliminate all overt
signs of expressivity or intentionality during filming. Through
the suppression of thought and will in his models, Bresson aims
at a kind of naturalness, yet he also seeks the unexpected and
the unknown, that which is beyond either the model’s or the
director’s intentions, but which the camera alone can capture.
Models, says Bresson (1975/1997, p. 30/33), are “automatically
inspired, inventive,” for it is “a mechanism [that] makes the
unknown come forth” (p. 69/69). The result of this practice is a
cinema inhabited by hyper-alert sleepwalkers, curiously doubled
presences that seem separated from themselves, often apparently
flat and unemotional, yet suddenly traversed by intense and
unexpected affects.
To Choose to Choose—To Believe in this World 45
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:11  Page 45
Deleuze argues that in Bresson’s models we see a manifesta-
tion of the thinker within modern cinematic thought, which
Deleuze labels the “spiritual automaton” (a term borrowed from
Spinoza and Leibniz). If our contemporary dilemma is that of a
loss of faith in this world, the dilemma of an “intolerable” bad-
movie world devoid of genuine possibility, the only means of
overcoming this dilemma is to think differently, and, indeed,
only such a different kind of thought constitutes genuine think-
ing. To think differently, however, is in a sense to exceed our
present thought, to go beyond what we know and hold certain.
Only by injecting into thought something uncharted and
incomprehensible, a pure Outside, can genuine thinking begin.
When this occurs, another thinker arises within thought, a
thinker that is a function of the breakdown of ordinary thought,
and hence one might say, a thinker that is a perpetual product
of the “impotence of thought.” In modern cinema, thinking dif-
ferently consists of unchaining the image-chains of received
opinions and beliefs and then re-enchaining images through the
gaps between then. Each gap is a locus of the Outside, within
which conventional thought stutters and collapses, while in that
same gap another thinker within thought begins to arise, an
alien, non-human (or a-human) thinker, an automaton pro-
duced by and productive of the Outside.
Bresson’s screen models, then, are both manifestations of the
spiritual automaton and figures of that alien thinker within
thought that is generated in the modern cinema. The spiritual
automaton, finally, is not something limited to embodiment in
the humans on the screen, but a function distributed across a
given film through its gaps, as well as a function generated with-
in spectators when the film succeeds in meeting its ends. Such a
function arises through a practice, that of unchaining conven-
tional chains of images and re-enchaining, each new juxtaposi-
tion being a throw of the dice, a choice to trust in the possibili-
ties of the unpredictable and unknowable. The modern
cinematic practice of unchaining and re-enchaining via the gap
of the Outside is a practice of choosing to choose, a mode of
existence that generates the spiritual automaton. We should
note as well, however, that choosing to choose is not entirely a
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matter of will and personal decision. Kierkegaard’s leap of faith
is a leap beyond reason and into the absurd, but it remains a
leap of the individual thinker possessed of an identity and a will.
In appropriating Kierkegaard for his immanent ethics Deleuze
might be suspected of simply repeating Sartre’s existential modi-
fication of Kierkegaard, but choosing to choose is not a matter
of authenticity or a personal commitment to freedom. Rather, it
is a matter of generating an alien thinker within thought, one
that only emerges at the limits of will and reason. The spiritual
automaton is such a thinker, one proper to the modern cinema,
and in Bresson’s handling of his models we find an instance of
the practice of choosing to choose. Bresson “radically
suppress[es] the intentions of [his] models” (Bresson 1975/1997,
p. 22/25), and he frees their movements from any subor -
dination “to the will and to thought” (p. 29/32). Once they
“become automatic, protected against all thought”
(p. 114/110), they become “automatically inspired, inventive”
(p. 30/33), instances of “a mechanism [that] makes the
unknown come forth” (p. 69/69).
Bresson’s cinematic models may be regarded as figures of the
spiritual automaton, but in one specific sense they may also
serve as guides to an understanding of Deleuze’s conception of
cinema’s relationship to philosophy. Bresson’s models deliver
their lines as if their words were someone else’s. As they speak,
linguistic signs begin to separate from visual signs; the verbal
and the visual diverge into separate strata of sound and sight.
This splitting of seeing from speaking, and this assimilation of
language within a sonic continuum, are fundamental to modern
cinema and to its potential for inducing new thought. 
What does Deleuze find most appealing about cinema?
Deleuze is fascinated by the visual, and especially by the possi-
bility of seeing differently. The basic obstacle to seeing different-
ly is conventional narrative, and by extension, language. In his
study of Francis Bacon, Deleuze identifies Bacon’s primary aim
as that of rendering images devoid of narrative connotations. In
his essay on Beckett’s television plays, Deleuze argues that
Beckett attempts to move beyond words, to dry up the voices
that incessantly tell their mundane stories, and to bring forth
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pure images, both visual and sonic, which are freed from all nar-
rative associations. Even in his many writings on literature,
Deleuze pays little attention to narrative per se, and in his book
on masochism he shows that Sacher-Masoch’s fictions are mere
stagings of frozen visual tableaus. And in his last book, Essays
Critical and Clinical, Deleuze asserts that one of literature’s pri-
mary functions is to create within language what he calls
Visions and Auditions, visual and sonic images at the limits of
language that arise within the verbal like hallucinatory presences
looming between or floating above the words.
For Deleuze, thinking differently is fundamentally a matter of
seeing differently, and for him cinema is above all a visual medi-
um. What distinguishes cinema from painting is, first, that
movement and time are directly rendered within the visual cine-
matic image, and, second, that cinema immediately engages the
problem of vision’s relation to language and conventional narra-
tive. With the collapse of the sensori-motor schema in modern
film, detached, “unchained” visual images arise, while at the
same time commonsense narratives fall apart. Language is cut
loose from its network of conventional associations with visual
images and becomes part of a sonic continuum. Language
enters into a back-and-forth relay with visual images, but as a
component of the sonic continuum, it also tends toward its own
aural limit as a-signifying affective sound. Cinema’s distinction
among the arts, then, is that of being the art that most fully and
most directly engages the crucial philosophical problem of
thinking differently by seeing differently.
The cinematic agent of this new mode of seeing is the spiritu-
al automaton, a strange kind of agent in that it is less the cause
of a new seeing than the produced locus within which such see-
ing arises. In this regard, it has as its analogue in philosophy
what Deleuze and Guattari call the “conceptual persona,” the
similarity between the spiritual automaton and the conceptual
persona suggesting one final aspect of cinema’s privileged rela-
tionship with philosophy. In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and
Guattari approach philosophy as the invention of concepts,
arguing that such invention requires three elements: concepts, a
plane of immanence, and a conceptual persona. The conceptual
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persona “is not the representative of the philosopher, but the
reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal
conceptual persona” (Deleuze et Guattari 1991/1994, p. 62/64).
The conceptual persona at once precedes and follows the plane
of immanence, in this regard both producing and being pro-
duced by thought. It is “the becoming or the subject of a [given]
philosophy” (Deleuze et Guattari 1991/1994, p. 63/64) that
arises within the philosopher as a separate, “other” thinker. And
above all, it is a locus of movement in thought. “In the philo-
sophical énoncé,” say Deleuze and Guattari, “one does not pro-
duce something by saying it, but one produces movement by
thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona”
(1991/1994, pp. 63/64-65).
In What Is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari assert that the
conceptual persona is a component of all genuine philosophical
thought, but it is clear that their inspiration for the notion
comes primarily from such “philosophers of the future” as
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze
says that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are the first philosophers to
put movement within thought, and they do so by fashioning a
theatre of philosophy, with its heroes being Abraham and Job in
the one theatre, and Dionysus and Zarathustra in the other.
Those actors are the conceptual personae of Kierkegaard’s and
Nietzsche’s thought, vectors that arise within thought as a-per-
sonal agents of movement. Given the similarity between the
conceptual persona and the spiritual automaton, perhaps, then,
we should rephrase Deleuze and say that Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche create not a theatre but a cinema of philosophy, with
conceptual personae that function like spiritual automata, gen-
erating and being generated by different ways of thinking.
In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari outline the fun-
damental elements of philosophy, and then differentiate philos-
ophy first from the sciences and then from the arts. The domain
of the arts is said to be that of sensation, the aim of the arts
being the creation of affects and percepts on a plane of composi-
tion. Philosophy, by contrast, has as its goal the creation of con-
cepts on a plane of immanence. The arts’ plane of composition
is identified as a plane of the possible, whereas philosophy’s
To Choose to Choose—To Believe in this World 49
Cine?mas 16, 2-3:Cinémas 16, 2-3  02/03/07  15:11  Page 49
plane of immanence is a plane of the virtual (Deleuze et
Guattari 1991/1994, pp. 168/177-78). In What Is Philosophy?
Deleuze and Guattari’s treatment of the arts focuses almost
exclusively on painting, music and literature, with virtually no
references to film, an absence explained perhaps by Deleuze’s
having already written at length on cinema, but perhaps also by
the fact that cinema blurs the line between philosophy and the
arts, a line Deleuze and Guattari are intent on sharpening in
What Is Philosophy?. This neat demarcation of philosophy from
the arts seems especially challenged by the notion of the possible
in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, for the possible in those works is
the dimension of creation in general, whether it be a creation in
philosophical concepts or a creation in cinematic images. The
possible is the domain of experimentation on the real, a zone in
which possibilities are produced through disruptive critical prac-
tices, but in which as well the possibility of the new is anticipat-
ed as an outcome of each experimentation. The possible, thus, is
the domain of an ethics and a faith common to thought in gen-
eral.
The “strange thought” Deleuze finds in the philosophy
of Kierkegaard and the cinema of Bresson is one that affirms an
ethic of choosing to choose and a faith of belief in this world.
Kierkegaard fashions a cinematic philosophy, whose conceptual
personae produce genuine movement within thought, leaping
beyond universal reason and morality into a future of unknow-
able possibilities. Bresson constructs a philosophical cinema,
whose models are embodied spiritual automata, their speech
and actions manifesting a split between words and images,
between hearing and seeing. This split induces fissures in the
continuities of conventional narratives. Kierkegaard and
Bresson’s common ethic may have a transcendent religious
dimension, but its practice promotes an immanent ethics.
Choosing to choose is a mode of existence, a way of living in
this world, and the faith that informs it is a belief in the possi-
bilities of this world as well. The single aim of philosophy and
cinema is to think differently, to unchain the sequences of
inevitabilities governed by received opinion and belief, and then
to reconnect the pieces in contingent yet necessary Markov
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chains. Thinking differently entails choosing to choose, adopt-
ing a way of living that allows a belief in the world’s “possibili-
ties in movements and intensities to give birth once again to
new modes of existence” (Deleuze et Guattari 1991/1994,
p. 72/74). As Deleuze and Guattari say in What Is Philosophy?,
“it may be that believing in this world, in this life, has become
our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence yet to
be discovered on our plane of immanence today” (Deleuze et
Guattari 1991/1994, p. 72/75).
University of Georgia
NOTES
1. All translations from Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bresson are my own.
Page references are to the French edition, followed by the corresponding passage in
the published English translation.
2. There are, of course, many different readings of Kierkegaard. My own is largely
consonant with that of Hannay (1982, see especially pp. 19-89). For a very different,
deconstructive reading of Kierkegaard and Repetition, see Poole 1993 (especially
pp. 61-82).
3. Deleuze himself makes reference to the Markov chain to describe the principle
of historical succession in Foucault’s philosophy (see Deleuze 1986/1988, pp. 92/86
and 125/117). In “Sur les principaux concepts de Michel Foucault,” a text written
shortly after Foucault’s death in 1984 and published in Deux régimes de fous, Deleuze
says of Foucault’s diagrams of systems of thought: “Between two diagrams, between
two states of a diagram, there is a mutation, a reshaping of relations of force. This is
not because anything can be linked [s’enchaîne] with anything. It’s rather like
successive drawings of lots, each one of which operates by chance, but in extrinsic
conditions determined by the preceding drawing. It’s a mixture of the aleatory and
the dependent as in a Markov chain” (Deleuze 2003, p. 237). Deleuze most likely
draws his understanding of the Markov chain from one of his favourite writers, the
philosopher of biology Raymond Ruyer, who discusses Markov chains in La genèse des
formes vivantes (1958, pp. 170-89).
4. Deleuze (2003, pp. 56-257) underlines the significance of the intolerable in
Foucault’s thought in a 1986 interview, saying that Foucault “was something of a seer.
What he saw was for him intolerable. . . . His own ethics was one of seeing or seizing
something as intolerable. It was not in the name of morality. It was his way of
thinking. If thought did not go all the way to the intolerable, it was not worth the
trouble of thinking at all. To think was always to think to the limit of something.”
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